We apply algorithmic data reading and textual analysis to compare the features of contracts in regulated industries subject to public scrutiny (which we call "public contracts") with relational private contracts. We show that public contracts are lengthier and have more rule-based rigid clauses; in addition, their renegotiation is formalized in amendments. We also find that contract length and the frequency of rigidity clauses increases in political contestability and closer to upcoming elections. We maintain that the higher rigidity of public contracts is a political risk adaptation strategy carried out by public agents attempting to lower third-party opportunistic challenges. (ISNIE 2013), and the World Bank for their comments. We are particularly indebted to Emmanuelle Auriol, Oliver Hart, Jack Gansler, Ricard Gil, Paul Grout, Jeremy Mayer, Edward Rhodes, Stéphane Saussier, Giancarlo Spagnolo, and Joao Veiga Malta for their helpful suggestions and to Scott Masten for his extensive review of an early version of this paper.
Contracting is at the basis of every economic activity and has been an important subject of study at law, economics, and business schools. Yet scant empirical studies have examined contract features of large samples of contracts (Schwartz and Scott 2010) .
Previous-mostly theoretical-works have focused on contract completeness (Schwartz and Scott 2003; Shavell 2006) , particularly contract interpretation. The cost of writing a contract increases with the number of contingencies addressed in the contract (Dye 1985) .
Incompleteness arises endogenously from an insufficient description of the parties' behavior (i.e., discretion) and insufficient contingency of the parties' obligations to external statesthat is, rigidity (Battigalli and Maggi 2002) . The costs of designing optimal complex contracts can be prohibitively expensive for the involved parties. Enforcing such contracts can also be costly. Therefore, involved parties often prefer to use simple contracts (Schwartz and Watson 2004) . A positive correlation exists between complexity (e.g., measured by contract length) and the probability that parties choose arbitration over court litigation (Drahozal and Hylton 2003; Drahozal and Ware 2010) .
The empirical analysis of contracts presents two challenges: the dearth of explanatory variables and the subtle contract variations arising from the interaction of terms. A series of contracting papers published beginning in the mid-1980s addressed these hindrances. Joskow (1985, 1987) analyzed vertical integration, contract duration, and relation-specific investments based on contracts between coal suppliers and electric utilities. Masten and Crocker (1985 , 1988 , 1991 examined the tradeoffs between the design and duration under price regulation and the processes by which parties adjust prices in long-term contracts to encourage flexibility and avoid opportunism in the production of onshore natural gas wells. Crocker and Reynolds (1993) studied the optimal degree of contractual incompleteness in pricing procedures used in Air Force engine procurement contracts. Lafontaine (1992 Lafontaine ( , 1993 explored the determinants of franchise agreements under risk sharing and moral hazard in various business activities. Masten and Snyder (1993) analyzed the use of specific lease provisions to supply quality equipment without the need for comprehensive contracting in the shoemaking industry. Leffler and Rucker (1991) investigated the incentives associated with lump-sum (transaction costs-covering) and per unit payment (risk-sharing) provisions in timber-harvesting contracts. Similarly, Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993) looked at cash rent versus cropshare agricultural contracts. Yet these studies, with a few exceptions, focused on particular sectors, were geographically restricted, and were based on a limited number of observations. 1 In most cases, contractual attributes were identified as dummy or ordered variables. Schwartz and Watson (2012) tackled the question of which institutional environment demonstrates a preference for arbitration. Arbitration is less costly than court trials, but requires more accurate contracts. These authors provided a model, supported by empirical evidence using a large set of contracts filed through the Stock and Exchange Commission (SEC), in which a welfare-maximizing enforcer induces the contracting parties to make socially efficient trade-offs between interpretation accuracy and cost of contract writing-namely, between the trial cost and investment in the deal. Spiller (2008) and Moszoro and Spiller (2012) presented a complementary rationale for public contracts' rigidity in politically contestable markets. Even if the enforcer is a welfare maximizer, the public agent is subject to political hazards. Therefore, public contracts are more rigid-have more rule-based "explicit" terms-than purely private contracts as a political risk adaptation of the public agent to keep at bay plausible challenges by third parties. The increased cost of rigidity is externalized to the public at large.
Strong anecdotical evidence indicates the rigidity of public contracts, but no comprehensive empirical study exists. Our approach is similar to that of Schwartz and Watson (2012) in that we use the same data source (SEC filings) and analogous algorithmic data reading, but our study differs in its controls, treatment, and testable predictions. Using data scraping and word clustering from more than 200,000 contracts across all states and a wide variety of industries filed through the SEC's Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, we test Moszoro and Spiller's (2012) hypothesis of higher rigidity of public contracts compared with the rigidity of purely private contracts.
A Model of Contractual Rigidity

2
Contracting cost rises exponentially with contract rigidity and determines the trade-off between interpretation accuracy and the cost of contract writing, as shown by Schwartz and Watson 1 With the exception of Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993) , who collected an impressive survey of 1, 628-3,432 agricultural contracts, and Lafontaine (1992, 1993) , who relied on a cross-section of 548 contracts, these studies were based on datasets that included from 44 to 299 observations.
2 This section follows Moszoro and Spiller (2012) .
(2012).
In Spiller (2008) , the lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation aimed at limiting the hazards from opportunistic third parties-political opponents, competitors, interest groups-while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Following Moszoro and Spiller (2012) , we assume that public agents minimize both contracting and political costs given by:
where K(R) is adaptation costs rising exponentially with contract rigidity, ρ is the likelihood of a challenge by an opportunistic third party and τ is the likelihood of success of an opportunistic challenge (both decreasing with contract rigidity), and T 0 is the public agent's (political) cost if a challenge by third parties is successful. Third parties observe benefits from opportunistic challenge, but the public agent does not know ex ante the particular value of these benefits for third parties. Third parties' overall benefits from an opportunistic challenge correspond to a random normally distributed variable T 0 . Moszoro and Spiller (2012) showed that in equilibrium third parties challenge a contract only if expected gains T 0 ζτ are greater than litigation costs c(R):
where ζ ∈ (0, 1] is a political concentration parameter: if ζ = 1, the TPO challenger's benefits are symmetrical to the incumbent public agent's TPO costs (e.g., a bipartisan political market); if ζ < 1, the political market is fragmented and the challenger does not internalize all benefits from a successful contract protest.
Litigation costs c(R) rise in R. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge, thereby lowering third parties' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. Any deviation from equilibrium rigidity R * makes the public agent worse off:
outmatches gains in political cost decrease) Moszoro and Spiller (2012) derive two testable predictions on the contractual design depending on the characteristics of the contracting parties:
Prediction 1 Equilibrium contract rigidity increases in political costs; thus, contracts subject to public scrutiny show more rigidity clauses than purely private (i.e., relational) contracts.
Prediction 2 In the sub-sample of public contracts, rigidity increases with political contestability (high ζ).
Data and Methodology
SEC's EDGAR Database
All public companies operating in the U.S., both foreign and domestic, are required to file registration statements, periodic reports, and other forms electronically through the SEC's EDGAR system. The required disclosure filings made by publicly traded companies frequently contain contracts that are of material interest to investors. Filing requirements for compliance with SEC's regulations are described in Overdahl (1991) . 3 Although this information is available to the public, research on contracting has been stymied by a lack of parametrization.
We used the directEDGAR engine developed by Burch Kealey from the University of Nebraska at Omaha to extract all data in Exhibit 10 from the 10-K filings filed from 1998 to 2013. The following subsections describe the data treatment step by step.
Data Treatment
Step 1: Rough Data
An issuer must file an Exhibit 10 to a registration statement and periodically report "material contracts" described in items 601(b)(10) of Regulation S-K and Regulation S-B. Examples of different types of material contracts include: asset purchase agreements; bridge loan agreements, cash bonus plans, director fee agreements, director indemnification plans, employment agreements, executive compensation plans and incentive plans, financial services agreements, joint venture agreements, lease agreements, letters of intent, license agreements, pension plans, profit sharing plans, purchase agreements, stock option agreements, stock purchase agreements, and termination agreements.
3 A modern index to forms is available at: http://www.sec.gov/ info/edgar/forms/edgform.pdf.
We retrieved material contracts through directEDGAR, which collects data from the SEC's FTP server. The data in this system consists of electronic filings by corporations and individual filers to the SEC. We used the form type index to identify Exhibit 10 documents included with the filing of forms 10-K, which require the inclusion of material contracts, and then retrieved each Exhibit 10 from the location indicated in the filing index.
We retrieved 206,677 contracts dated from 1998 to 2013 and translated all files to machinereadable ASCII text format. 4 We measured contract length by the geometric average of the word count of three common English words: "the", "and", and "of". We then used the natural logarithm of character count for file length normalization.
Step 2: Company Identification
We identified each filing company by the SEC's Central Index Key (CIK) and linked it to the company's ticker, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, location, and financial characteristics retrieved from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 5 We dropped 26,282 filings to which no CIK or SIC code was associated.
Step 3: Public versus Private
We classified the contracts as "Utilities" and "Quasi-regulated" (i.e., where one public agency, state, county, or municipality is involved) versus purely "Private" using the SIC code 6 of the filing party. Unfortunately, we were not able to identify non-reporting contractees.
(a) Filing companies whose SIC code begins with 6 (Finance) and 9 (Administration) were filtered out (b) "Utilities": filing companies whose SIC code is between 4900 and 4999-namely, electric, gas and sanitary services, electric services, natural gas transmission, natural gas transmission and distribution, natural gas distribution, electric and other services combined, gas and other services combined, water supply, sanitary services, refuse systems, hazardous waste management, steam and air-conditioning supply, 7 and cogeneration services and small power producers.
(c) "Quasi-regulated industries": filing companies whose SIC code is between 4000 and 4499
and between 4800 and 4899-namely, railroad switching and terminal establishments, local and suburban transit, interurban highway passenger transportation, trucking and courier services (no air), trucking (no local), public warehousing and storage, terminal maintenance facilities for motor freight transport, water transportation, deep sea foreign transportation of freight, telephone communications (no radiotelephone), telegraph and other message communications, radio broadcasting stations, television broadcasting stations, cable and other pay television services, and communication services.
(d) "Private": filing companies whose SIC code starts with 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, or 8 and whose SIC code is between 4500 and 4799.
Public utilities provide and maintain the infrastructure for key public services-electricity, natural gas, water, and sewage. In the U.S. private public utilities are subject to public regulation ranging from local community to statewide: government control through a public utility commission. 8
We distilled 20,200 public contracts and 123,543 private contracts.
Step 4: Word Count and Categorization
We used Schwartz and Watson's (2012) keyword list of arbitration clauses-arbitration (and variants), whereas, court, appeal, mediation, litigation, warranty, guaranty, specification, and deposition-as the starting point and complemented the list with 21 keywords, grouped them into seven rigidity categories: arbitration, certification, evaluation, litigation, penalties, termination, and design.
In textual analysis and computer science, these categories are referred to as "dictionaries."
7 For the sake of clarity, SIC code 4961: Steam and Air-conditioning Supply refers to utilities engaged in the production and/or distribution of steam and heated or cooled air for sale, not to commercial and industrial air-conditioning equipment. Its equivalent NAICS Code is 221330. For a manual of SIC codes, see: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic manual.html.
8 For public scrutiny and accountability in the contracting practice at a water utility, see Appendix A.
We used them to "teach" our software to machine-read contractual categories. Our use of categories is analogous to Parkhe's (1993) efforts in the management literature concerning contract analysis and to Loughran and McDonald's (2011) We conjecture, following Spiller (2008) and Moszoro and Spiller (2012) , that these rigidity categories capture relevant contractual clauses that lower the likelihood of a challenge by opportunistic third parties. Our rationale for (and contribution to) the use of rigidity categories instead of the use of a simple aggregate is to open the black box on contractual rigidity and assess its magnitude and significance at a granular level.
We developed an keyword count by data scraping. Step 5: Descriptive Categories
We scraped keywords contained in the first 100 lines of the filings to identify the type of contract, as presented in Table ( Our identification of amendments by keywords in the document heading may capture primary contracts with an "integration" (also known as "merger" or "entire agreement") clause. 10
Integrated agreements, however, are a formal amendment for the purposes of this research and does not affect our results. Table ( 3) presents the summary of the dataset construction step by step, and Tables (4) and (5) present the characterization and summary statistics of the output dataset of commercial contracts.
Contract Features and Hypotheses
The contract features that we use as proxies of complexity are: length, clusters of rigidity clauses, and number of amendments to contracts. Descriptive categories are used as control variables for fixed effects. We were unable to extract the duration and value of the contracts.
We advance the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Public contracts are lengthier than private contracts.
Hypothesis 2 Public contracts have more rigidity clauses than private contracts.
Hypothesis 3 Public contracts are renegotiated through formal processes and, thus, have more amendments than private contracts; in addition, public contracts' amendments include more rigidity clauses than private contracts' amendments.
9 These contracts are commonly agreements related to the ongoing business activities, not only one-time events as, for example, the construction of a generation plant for an electric utility.
10 An example of an integration clause is provided below:
This is the entire agreement between the parties. It replaces and supersedes any and all oral agreements between the parties, as well as any prior writings. Modifications and amendments to this agreement, including any exhibit or appendix, shall be enforceable only if they are in writing and are signed by authorized representatives of both parties. 
Identification Strategy
As "predictors" of complexity of public contracts, we used length (hypothesis (1)) and frequency of rigidity clauses (hypothesis (2)). We tested these hypotheses with OLS regressions for contract length and for rigidity category as described in equations (3) and (4), respectively:
where i is the contract index, U tilities i is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the contract i is a utilities contract and 0 otherwise, Quasi regulated i is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the contract i is a quasi-regulated contract and 0 otherwise (thus when both U tilities i and Quasi regulated i equal zero, it is a private-to-private contract), Length i is the length of contract i, 11 and Rigidity i,l is the frequency of rigidity keywords clustered in clauses 11 We proxied contract length by the geometric average of the count of the three most frequent words in English-"the", "and", and "of"-to circumvent the different formats of the filings and to cut outliers. l-arbitration, certification, evaluation, litigation, penalties, termination, and design as shown in Table ( 1)-calculated as the natural logarithm of the count of rigidity keywords divided by Length of file i:
Count of keywords of rigidity clause l in file i Length i
We controlled for total assets, capital expenditure, and sales; type of contract (license or sale/procurement); and industry (one-digit SIC), state, and year fixed effects. We also checked our results by filtering for long contracts only (without low decile filings in length). We applied log transformations to normalize skewed and wide distributions as well as provide a straightforward interpretation of our coefficients in relative terms.
To test hypothesis (3), we applied logit regressions of amendments on contract characteristics, controlling for contract length, sales, and state fixed effects, as specified in equation (6), and OLS regressions of the average number of amendments to total documents at the firm k level, as specified in equation (7):
In addition, we tested for rigidity clauses in amendments with analogous OLS equations to equation (4), filtering for amendments, as shown in equation (8):
Empirical Results
We found that utility contracts are lengthier, have more arbitration, evaluation, litigation, and penalty clauses, and have more amendments with more arbitration, evaluation, and penalty clauses than private contracts. Contracts in quasi-regulated industries are not significantly lengthier, but in some cases incorporate more penalty and design clauses than private contracts.
Table (6) shows the unconditional mean lengths of public utilities, quasi-regulated, and private contracts, and Table (7) shows the length mean-comparison t-test of public versus private contracts. On average, public contracts are lengthier than private contracts. public utilities and quasi-regulated versus private industry dummies, controlling for industry (one-digit SIC) fixed effects and excluding short filings (without the bottom 10% in terms of length). It shows that contracts are significantly lengthier when the filing entity is a public utility. Also, we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that contracts of quasi-regulated companies are lengthier than private contracts.
Tables (9), (10), and (11) show results of OLS regressions of rigidity clauses on contract characteristics. Public utilities contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private contracts.
In our general specification, public contracts feature more arbitration, certification, evaluation, litigation, and penalty clauses. Negative coefficients of contractual rigidity clauses are statistically insignificant.
As our variables are log-transformed on both sides, length estimates show the length elasticity of rigidity clauses. An increase in length is associated with more, but less frequent appearances of, rigidity clauses.
The fact that certification and design clauses do not appear to be statistically significant reinforces our rationale and excludes possible contract tailoring: Too specific certification and design could indicate "designative" or "tailored" specifications-that is, point to a specific contractor and be the source of favoritism (Lambert-Mogiliansky and Kosenok 2009).
Tables (13) and (14) show that the likelihood of an amendment is higher for public utilities and companies in quasi-regulated industries and that that average number of amendments clustered at the company level is higher for public utilities. Table ( 15) shows that amendments in public utilities contracts feature more arbitration, evaluation, litigation, and termination clauses than in private contract amendments. We conjecture that public contracts are renegotiated formally through amendments instead of relationally.
Robustness Check: Flexibility Words
Flexible clauses shift the emphasis of the contractual relationship from a detailed specification to adaptive terms in the face of changing circumstances (Goldberg 1976) . Therefore, relational long-term contracts (e.g., public utilities contracts) should show more flexible provisions to facilitate efficient adjustments that subdue the costs of plausible opportunistic renegotiations (Crocker and Masten 1991) .
To compare this view with ours, we counted words that introduce flexibility clauses: satisfactory, timely, good faith, diligent, proper, reasonable, reasonably, and unreasonably. Next, we tested whether these clauses better explain the contractual differences between public and private contracts. 12 Table 12 presents results of several regression specifications of flexibility words on contract characteristics. We found that public and private contracts use flexibility clauses to the same extent. This could suggest that public contracts are more state-contingent than private contracts-namely, equally flexible, but severely limited in the form revisions can take (Hart and Moore 1988).
Contractual Response to Political Contestability
Political contestability is the "extent to which a collective political actor or a system of such political actors possesses attributes, resources, positions, or other factors, in themselves or in their environments, that promote the ability to compete effectively in the political process" (Mitnick 1993, 12) . If a political system is characterized by contestability, then it is rational for interest groups to petition the government on behalf of their members (Getz 1997). In fact, in the U.S. and other democracies, interest groups do convey the concerns of their members to government officials and, thus, are a means by which citizens can influence government (Mundo 1992 ).
A contract is politically contestable when contractual decisions are subject to influence by potential (opportunistic) challengers. 13 If the political opposition is fragmented (low ζ), benefits from a challenge can go to any of the political competitors, not necessarily to the challenger who bears the cost of challenge c in equation (2). Public agents will respond to higher political contestability with higher contractual rigidity to reduce the likelihood of a challenge (Moszoro and Spiller 2012) .
Analogously to our previous hypotheses, we test within the regulated and quasi-regulated contracts sample the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 In politically contestable markets, public contracts: (a) are lengthier, (b) have more rigidity clauses, and (c) are renegotiated through formal processes and, thus, have more amendments than in less politically contestable markets.
Evidence of Political Contestability
We used the outcome of general elections for state governors to compute the measures of political contestability that might affect public contracts. 14 We assembled a dataset of general gubernatorial elections from 1980 to 2013 for all 50 U.S. states from the CQ Voting and Elections Collection (2014). The time span of the political series is larger to account for cumulative swings in the governmental administration at the time of signing the contract.
Next, we interpolated the last election outcome for non-election years and merged the resulting dataset with the subsample of public-utilities and quasi-regulated-contracts by state and year. Finally, we included a "year in office" variable equal to the difference between the contract year and the last election year plus one, thereby defining the tenure of the governor at the time of signing the contract.
We defined several complementary measures of political contestability:
where A z,t and B z,t are the winning and runner-up parties' vote shares respectively in district z at time t, and λ is an a priori threshold for political contestability (usually 10% in the U.S.), all in percentage points. In addition:
which measures the strength of the political opposition using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of residual (non-winning) parties' vote share weighted by the overall non-winning vote share in general elections in district z at time t. We expect the winning margin coefficients to be negative and the small winning margin and political opposition strength coefficients to be positive.
Using public contracts, we tested hypothesis (4) by running in-sample regressions using our measures of political contestability:
(
where i is the contract index, P C i,t are our political contestability variables (equations 9-11) in contract i matched by the state code and year, and Length i and Rigidity i,l are as defined in section 4. We control for type of contract and state fixed effects. Table ( 16) presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of contract length in the subsample of public contracts on political contestability variables. We found that public contract length rises in political contestability when controlling for state fixed effects: As expected, winning margins are inversely correlated with contract length and contract length increases when winning margins are narrow (i.e., the winning margin is below 10%) and the concentration of the political opposition is strong. The fact that political contestability variables are significant only when controlling for state fixed effects might indicate that they have a strong predicting power for time-varying political contestability within states, but not across states. 15
In political practice, the first and second year in office are "warming-up years"; the third year can be portrayed as the "working year" that will capitalize during the fourth and last year-the "elections race year". Accordingly, we found a significant increase in contract length in governors' third year of tenure in office, which might suggest that politicians are more careful in crafting their contracts to avoid political challenges.
Tables (17) and (18) show the results of OLS cross-section regressions of frequency of rigidity clauses in the subsample of public contracts on winning margins and winning margin dummies. The data indicate that increased political contestability increases the frequency of the appearance of arbitration and litigation clauses in public contracts. Interestingly, the political contestability effect is augmented when we regress only those states where the Republican Party won by a narrow margin, as shown in Table ( 19), panels A and B. This could suggest that the Republican Party is more sensitive to political risks, while the Democratic Party is more concerned about the agenda.
In unreported regressions, we also checked the sum, time-weighted, and average of partisan swings in the previous three elections at each year, as well as the winning margin squares for non-linear effects, but found that these variables are not explanatory of public contracting at the state level. We do not claim that our choice of political contestabiity variables is unique across all administrations. The set of variables that capture political contestability effects in a particular market may vary across countries and-within countries-across levels of administration.
We did not find evidence, however, that public contracts show more amendments in politically contestable markets (see Table 20 ). Unfortunately, we were not able to link amendments to contacts; therefore, we had to rely on the average number of amendments and average values of political contestability, thereby losing the within-state time variability.
Our estimations looked at the effects of political contestability on public contracts only.
As a robustness check, we reran our regressions for private contracts only (see Table 21 ). We found that private contracts are significantly lengthier for only one variable in one specification: winning margin with state fixed effects. However, the magnitude was economically insignificant (less than 0.5% lengthier contracts when the winning margin increases by one standard deviation) and the coefficient was positive (i.e., contrary to the expected). Therefore, we reject the alternative hypothesis that a common factor affects state political contestability and contract design (e.g., economic downturn).
Scope and Limitations of the Research
The presented results are robust to a series of tests controlling for corporate financials, state, and length and type of document. They are also robust to alternative explanations: Flexibility clauses and the subsample of private contracts do not show the same patterns as observed in rigidity clauses and public contracts.
Our estimates may be driven by sector/industry specificity; for example, public utilities contracts have more of certain rigidity clauses than private contracts. Furthermore, utilities have been around longer and may have learned to contract differently to survive. It is precisely this evolution into contract rigidities what we are trying to capture and endogenize. Public contracts are subject to third-party challenges; consequently, public agents have learned to minimize political hazards with contract rigidities.
Our results are, however, limited by the nature and sourcing of our data. Spiller (2008) and Moszoro and Spiller (2012) developed a theory of higher rigidity of public contracts related to similar goods/services procured by public versus private agents, whereas contracts filed in the 10-K of public utilities and private companies are not necessarily for similar goods/services.
We believe that the large sample of contracts in our collection reduces this object bias.
Contract complexity is correlated with the duration, geographical scope, and value of the contracts. Due to data treatment constraints, we were not able to excerpt and control for these variables, but somehow ameliorated these limitations through state and financial controls.
The results are also stained by two other implicit biases: subject and sample biases. As for the subject bias, we identified contracts of public utilities as public contracts. Truly public contracts would include procurement contracts from public agencies, government-sponsored enterprises, and governments-municipalities, counties, states, and the federal government.
These institutions, however, do not file 10-Q and 10-K and their records are not standardized and directly comparable.
As for the sample bias, it seems the SEC's EDGAR-although large-is not (yet) a comprehensive contract set. The small but still quantifiable ratio of unidentified companies by CIK raises concerns about sample bias as well. We cannot rule out multiple occurrences of the same contract. 16 We assume, however, that the filings and our sample are heterogeneous and representative of the whole contract population.
Contracting markets and political markets overlap only partially. Perfect overlapping implies local administrative or natural monopolies. Our measures of political contestability are determined by political districts, whereas contracting markets are given by the area covered by the companies.
16 For example, if Exxon sold cold to DTE Energy, the contract could show twice.
Finally, conclusions from our algorithmic data reading and word clustering methodology may differ by jurisdictions-between statutory and common law worlds, and within the common law system-thereby limiting its potential applicability. We partially addressed this issue by using state fixed effects to account for state law differences.
Concluding Remarks
The results of our textual analysis show that public contracts are lengthier and feature more arbitration, evaluation, litigation, and penalty clauses; in addition, their renegotiation is formalized in amendments with more arbitration, evaluation, litigation, and termination clauses.
We further found that these patterns are reinforced in political contestability in the subsample of public contracts.
Apart from the empirical results themselves, our paper contributes to the literature in a threefold manner:
(a) We provide a replicable methodology for the analysis of contracts. Textual analysis is a young, but promising avenue of research. It enables the creation of novel datasets from document libraries (i.e., plain text) to test a variety of contractual theories and bridge law and economics research and practice.
(b) We construct dictionaries that are descriptive of the multidimentional characteristics of public versus public contracts. These dictionaries can serve as a reference that can be further developed and extended to other contractual characteristics.
(c) We advance a plausible rationale with testable hypotheses of the difference between public and purely private contracts. Following Moszoro and Spiller (2012) , we sustain that the higher rigidity of public contracts is a political risk adaptation of public agents by which they lower the likelihood of success of third-party (opportunistic) challengers. Our results are consistent with this view.
Prospective research includes extending the analysis to other types of contracts (e.g., employment/compensation). On the methodology side, spacial analysis can be applied to identify the separating hyperplane of public and private contracts.
On a policy note, it would be worthy for the SEC to require in Exhibit 10 of the 10-Q and 10-K filings the description of type of contract filed (e.g., according to the ones described in items 601(b)(10) of Regulation S-K and Regulation S-B) and the identification of the non-filing counter party by CIK.
Appendix A Rigidity in Public Contracting at a Municipal Utility
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Public agencies in the State of California follow the California Public Contract Code (PCC) for procurement of materials and supplies, professional and general services, and construction contracts. The exact provisions of the contract vary by type and by agency. Almost universally, materials and supplies are awarded on a low bid basis, and professional and general services on a qualifications basis. The PCC has very limited applicability for design-build contracting (contracts for construction that are awarded to a designer and contractor on a the basis of a qualifications based construction process). Contracts must exceed a certain dollar threshold, be of a certain type (buildings, certain public works), and follow guidelines for a selection process and then final reporting to state agencies. The letter and intention of the PCC are to provide for equity and fairness in contracting and eliminate favoritism and collusion. To that end, public contracting procedures and contract documents contain provisions to comply with these requirements and guiding principals.
Public utilities have contract templates that have been developed over a period of several decades. Those utilities with active in-house design and contracting groups maintain their contract templates so that they comply with current legal requirements.
A list of standard contractual features, which ensure fairness and minimize collusion and protests, is presented below:
1. Public works construction contracts over a certain dollar threshold (in the case of the EBMUD, $70,000) must be publicly advertised and bid. Bids are publicly opened in an agency's board boom or similar public room, after being stamped and dated in the agency's purchasing division. Bids' documents are available for review by any interested party immediately after bid opening, and afterwards upon request. Bid results are summarized and posted online within one business day.
2. Employees with a financial interest in a company cannot be involved in a selection process that involves or potentially involves that company. Elected board officials cannot vote on contracts where they have a financial involvement. All supervisors and managers whose job involves public procurement decisions must file a Statement of Economic Interests annually with the Secretary of the District-this is a public record, available for public review.
3. Bids are objective and compared based on a total bid cost. Bid exceptions are not allowed. To make this possible, prescriptive specifications are developed to give clear, objective criteria on which bidders can base their bid. On occasion, performance based specifications are used, but enough specificity is provided to allow bidders to prepare a fixed price bid. Sole-source contracts are used on a very limited basis and are only allowed in limited circumstances under the PCC. Internal procedures exist to evaluate and approve the appropriateness of any sole-source specification. Regarding the bids themselves, official bid forms must be used, which include:
(a) A bid form with line items including either lump sum or unit cost bid; line items such as "allowances" are rarely used, and if used, it is in minor amounts with clear guidelines on how funds are to be authorized-in writing, after receiving and reviewing an estimate, only for specific tasks, etc. (g) Designation of subcontracts; and (h) Contract Equity program documents-usually specific to an agency, containing documentation of compliance with any local, small, or minority-and/or women-owned business requirements.
4. Bids are evaluated and reference documents checked, and ultimately formally awarded by the agency's regulating board:
(a) Bids can only be withdrawn in limited circumstances, as defined in the PCC (clerical error). This ensures fairness and stops the case of bidders testing the waters with a low bid and withdrawing if they find that they are significantly lower than other bidders.
(b) Bids with irregularities cannot be accepted (errors in bid documents that would allow a bidder to withdraw cannot be accepted, even if the bidder does not withdraw).
(c) Insurance, performance bonds, and eligibility to work on public works projects are checked.
5. Contracts are administered by construction management professionals. To track progress, make appropriate payments, and ensure completion of the project and that it meets appropriate standards, the following contract features are included:
(a) Payment and performance bonds for the full contract value (b) Liability, workers compensation, and builders risk insurance (the latter only if applicable) (c) Payment procedures, including requirements for schedule submittals, and documentation of charges, including payment of prevailing wages (required for all public works contracts) (d) Submittal procedures (for verifying if materials and equipment conform to specifications-prior to ordering and installation) (e) Construction inspection and independent materials testing (f) Change order procedures (usually issued on a lump sum basis, based on a contractor quote, reviewed and approved by an engineer, and signed off by a senior or manager, as appropriate for the amount of the change order; time and materials/force account change orders are used in limited circumstances) (g) Claims and dispute resolution procedures (h) Liquidated damages procedures for unapproved delays in contract completion (raging from $1,000 to several thousands per day, depending on actual damages) (i) Contracts are audited periodically 6. On higher-risk projects (higher risk due to cost, liability, and criticality of infrastructure), the following procedures are sometimes included:
(a) Expanded evaluation of bidder's and qualifications-in essence, a pre-qualification procedure. Contractors are selected on a low-bid basis, but must meet more stringent qualifications requirements (b) Higher insurance thresholds (c) Escrow bid documents: contractors submit their actual bid documents to the awarding agency after award; these are sealed by the contractor, stored in escrow, and only opened by both parties in the presence of a third party in case of a dispute. This aids in the equitable resolution of disputes (d) Higher liquidated damages (must be based on realistic estimates of damages) (e) Alternate dispute resolution procedures, involving appointed resolution boards, binding or nonbinding arbitration, mediation, etc.
(f) Specific processing provisions for third-party claims (g) Detailed pre-construction surveys on a property-by-property basis Regarding cost specifics:
1. Typical planning, design, and construction management costs amount to 10-15 percent of the total construction cost. These numbers vary based on job complexity and scale. Overall, smaller, more complex jobs have higher design and administration costs on a percentage basis.
2. Actual change order percentages for contracts tend to be around 5 percent (EBMUD budgets for 5-10 percent).
3. Protests on bids typically cost an agency $5,000-15,000, not including the differential cost to go to the next lowest bid. If a protest raises questions that are legitimate enough to question the low bid, but not definitive enough to reject the low bid without the risk of a counter-protest or further litigation, the option of re-bid (re-advertise and solicit for new bids) is usually chosen. If a re-bid is required, costs are $20,000-30,000, which does not include any possible increases in contract cost, even without scope changes.
4. Bid amount or ultimate contract cost as compared to engineer's estimate (EE) varies. The PCC requires that agencies demonstrate that adequate funding is available for a public works project before it is advertised. To comply with this, an in-house EE is prepared prior to advertising a project for award. When bids are received, if there is more than a 10 percent deviation between the low bid and the EE, the specifics are investigated. It is not uncommon to have a wider deviation. After an evaluation, if bids are deemed reasonable, adequate funding exists, and the work is deemed necessary, projects are awarded, even if they exceed the engineer's estimate. Typical reasons for cost deviation are as follows:
(a) When multiple bids (more than 3 to 5) are received, costs tend to be lower.
(b) In crisis times-like the current economy-favorable bids are received for most projects, since private sector work has significantly slowed over the past 2-3 years. In calendar years 2009-2010, bids on average, were 18 percent below the EE. In calendar year 2011, bids, on average were 3 percent under the EE. Part of this may reflect an improvement in the economy and more work available for bidders (meaning less need to bid low on public works projects). Part may be due to the agency's adjustment of EE to reflect current market costs.
(c) It seems to be consistently difficult to estimate costs on projects with extensive electrical work, instrumentation/controls or other technology projects, or work that the agency does not typically bid out.
(d) Certain commodities' costs fluctuate widely (e.g., concrete, metals), and so bids may be higher when costs are up or expected to widely fluctuate for the duration of the project. Contractors bid high to minimize their risk.
(e) Certain commodities have widely varying costs based on the quantity purchased (e.g., paving, fencing, concrete).
(f) Certain services, such as rock, concrete, asphalt, and soil disposal, vary widely in cost and based on local market. These services range in cost from free to being a revenue source or being a liability with a high cost per ton for disposal.
(g) On occasion, elements may be underestimated or overestimated by the agency due to an error with data or assumptions.
5. It is difficult to quantify costs for minimizing political risks. Agency projects are developed under the California Environmental Quality Act, which requires public input into projects and the mitigation of adverse effects. There is a political influence to shaping projects. Mitigation measures always add costs to a project (tree re-plantings, habitat restoration, longer pipeline routings to minimize traffic impacts, sound barriers, limited work hours, noise mitigations, etc.). These costs are scrutinized during project development, and a balance is made between the need to minimize impacts and responsibly spend public funds. Agencies may have internal guidelines for what constitutes appropriate and not excessive mitigation measures. Step Treatment Count Degrees of freedom = 2357 Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff = 0 Ha: diff > 0 Pr(T < t) = 0.9655 Pr(| T |>| t |) = 0.0690 Pr(T > t) = 0.0345 Table 8 : This table presents results from cross-section OLS regressions of main contract length on contract attributes: public utilities and quasi-regulated versus private industries. Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". Utilities and quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Assets total equal the natural logarithm of the values in US$. Controls include: assets total, industry (one-digit SIC) fixed effects, and excluding short filings (without bottom 10% in length). Data are from the SEC's EDGAR database. Sample period is 1998-2013. Standard errors are in parentheses; * denotes significance at 10%, * * significance at 5%, and * * * significance at 1%.
Length of Public Contracts
(1) Table 9 : This table presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of frequency of rigidity clauses on contract attributes: public versus private and contract length. The frequency of each rigidity clause is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the count of rigidity words divided by the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". Utilities and quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Data are from the SEC's EDGAR database. Sample period is 1998-2013. Standard errors are in parentheses; * denotes significance at 10%, * * significance at 5%, and * * * significance at 1%.
Rigidity Clauses in Public Contracts
(1) private and contract length. The frequency of each rigidity clause is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the count of rigidity words divided by the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". Utilities and quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Controls include: type of contract, state, and year fixed effects. Data are from the SEC's EDGAR database. Sample period is 1998-2013. Standard errors are in parentheses;
+ denotes significance at 15%, * significance at 10%, * * significance at 5%, and * * * significance at 1%.
(1) Table 11 : This table presents results from OLS cross-section regressions of frequency of rigidity clauses on contract attributes: public versus private and contract length. The frequency of each rigidity clause is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the count of rigidity words divided by the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". Utilities and quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Controls include state and year fixed effects. We excluded short filings (bottom 10% in length). Data are from the SEC's EDGAR database. Sample period is 1998-2013. Standard errors are in parentheses; * denotes significance at 10%, * * significance at 5%, and * * * significance at 1%.
(1) private and contract length. The frequency of each flexibility clause is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the count of rigidity words divided by the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". Utilities and quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Controls include state and year fixed effects. We excluded short filings (bottom 10% in length 
Flexibility Clauses in Public Contracts
(1) industries, and private companies. The dependent variable equals one when a document is an amendment. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one when the filing is an amendment to a commercial contract. Utilities and quasi-regulated are dummy variables equal to one when the filing company is a public utility or a quasi-regulated industry, respectively. Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". 
Likelihood of Amendments of Public Contracts compared with Private Contracts
(1) 
Average Number of Amendments to Public Contracts Compared with Private Contracts
Political Contestability Effects on Public Contract Length
(1) Winning margin is the difference between the winner's and the runner-up's share vote in percentage points. Length is the natural logarithm of the geometric average of the sum of "the", "and", and "of". We control for type of contract (license or sale/procurement). Data are from the SEC's EDGAR database and the CQ Voting and Elections Collection. Sample period is 1998-2013. Standard errors are in parentheses; * denotes significance at 10%, * * significance at 5%, and * * * significance at 1%.
Winning Margin Effect on Public Contract Rigidity Clauses
(1) variables. Average amendments is the ratio of the total number of amendments to total number of filings per public company. Average winning margin is the difference between the average of the winner's and the runner-up's share vote in percentage points; average small winning margin is a the average of the dummy variable equal to one when the winning margin is narrow (below 10%); and average political opposition strength is measured as the average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of residual (non-winning) parties' vote share in general elections weighted by the overall non-winning vote share in general elections. Controls include: the natural logarithm of sales in US$ and type of contract (license or sale/procurement) and state fixed effects. Data are from the SEC's EDGAR database. Sample period is 1998-2013. Standard errors are in parentheses; * denotes significance at 10%, * * significance at 5%, and * * * significance at 1%.
Political Contestabilty Effects on Average Amendments in Public Contracts
Political Contestability Effects on Private Contract Length
